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I n his 1999 paper, "Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention" Michael Bratman argues that two prevailing de-scriptions of the nature of intentions, Resolution and So-phistication, are inadequate.  By way of a series of exam-
ples Bratman attempts to demonstrate that Resolution theory is 
too restrictive, creating situations in which actors are not capable 
of altering their choices based on a new evaluative ranking of 
their options.  Sophistication theory, according to Bratman, is 
unable to explain our intuitions in cases in which the actor 
should not change her intentions, despite a current evaluative 
ranking to the contrary.  In order to address these weaknesses, 
Bratman introduces his No-Regret theory, which he believes re-
solves the problems faced by Resolution and Sophistication.   In 
this paper I will reconstruct Bratman's arguments, demonstrating 
how he believes that the No-Regret theory improves upon the 
other two views.  I will then demonstrate a crucial error in Brat-
man's reasoning, to wit: in his development of No-Regret theory 
he ceases to address intentions, according to most accepted defi-
nitions of the term.  Finally I will introduce a means of classify-
ing intentions—call it Intention Indefeasibility.  Appeals to this 
definition of intention will jibe with the more traditional concep-
tions of intention, and will, by comparison, demonstrate the flaw 
in Bratman's argument. 
 Bratman’s article investigates rational agency.  That is, he 
aims to discover what would be rational for a planning agent to 
do in a given situation.  Planning agents “settle in advance on 
prior, partial plans for future action, fill them in as time goes by, 
and execute them when the time comes.”1  In his attempt to for-
mulate a theory to explain rational planning, Bratman recognizes 
an inherent tension.  That is, while planning agents formulate 
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their plans in advance, they remain temporal agents, retaining 
control over what they do at the moment.  Any theory must ac-
commodate the agent’s ability to alter her plans, but at the same 
time retain the importance of past plans in current decisions.  
Bratman stresses the importance of plan stability: 
 
By settling now what she will do later a planning 
agent puts herself in a position to plan appropri-
ate preliminary steps and means…This will work 
only if her plans are to some extent stable…not 
constantly starting from scratch…A theory of in-
strumentally rational planning agency is in part a 
theory of intention and plan stability: a theory of 
when an instrumentally rational planning agent 
should or should not reconsider and abandon a 
prior intention.2 
 
It is this aspect of the theory that most concerns this paper, i.e. 
intention stability.  When should a rational agent alter her inten-
tions?  It seems reasonable to grant that one’s intentions might 
change due to the receipt of previously unforeseen information.  
For example, one’s intention to see a new movie might be 
changed by discovering that the movie theatre has closed.  How-
ever, it is key for Bratman’s theory that it is possible for inten-
tions to change, even without the intervention of unforeseen 
events.  This will be discussed at greater length later in the paper. 
 It is helpful here to discuss the two planning strategies 
that Bratman is criticizing: Sophistication and Resolution.  A So-
phisticated agent, “Adjusts her prior plans to insure that what 
she plans to do will be, at the time of action, favored by her then-
present evaluative rankings.”3  The Sophisticated planner oper-
ates based on the conjunction of the linking principle with the 
standard view:  
 
Linking Principle: States that if a rational agent has formed a 
plan (at time t1) to perform action A at a later time (t2) given a 




should not suppose at time t1 that at t2 they will not A 
Standard View:  Instrumental rationality depends on the agent’s 
evaluative rankings at the time of the action. 
 
The alternate strategy, Resolution, operates based on the linking 
principle alone, ignoring the standard view all together.  Essen-
tially Resolution states that, “If it was best in prospect to settle on 
a prior plan, and if there is no unanticipated information or 
change in basic values, then it is rational to follow through with 
the plan.”4 
Bratman is seeking to demonstrate the inability of these 
two prevailing planning strategies to properly handle instrumen-
tally rational planning agency.  In doing this, Bratman introduces 
a class of examples that he believes will exceed the bounds of any 
existing planning strategy: 
 
In all… cases there is a prior plan or policy set-
tling on which is best in prospect.  And in [these] 
cases the agent knows that when the occasion for 
action arrives her rankings of then-present options 
will argue against following through.5 
 
As stated in the above quote, in each example an agent will form 
a plan of action, and without any unforeseen events taking place, 
find themselves in a position in which their current evaluative 
rankings favor some different action.  Bratman holds that a 
proper strategy model should return results in keeping with our 
intuitions, that is, in situations in which a rational agent should 
alter their plans, the model should give that result.  Conversely, 
when the plans should be carried out, despite current rankings, 
the model should give that result. 
A class of cases in which a rational agent should change 
their plans is identified by Bratman as cases of “Autonomous 
Benefit”, in which the reward for an action is separated from the 
action itself.  Simply forming the intention to perform said action 
brings about the benefit.  It is in this section that Bratman’s 
“Toxin Case” is introduced.  A quick sketch of the case:   
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A billionaire… offers to give me a lot of money on 
Tuesday if I form an intention on Monday to 
drink a disgusting but non-lethal toxin on 
Wednesday.  I would be more than willing to 
drink the toxin to get the money.  However, to get 
the money I do not need to drink the toxin; I just 
need to intend on Monday to drink it.6 
 
Questions abound.  What would an instrumentally rational plan-
ning agent do?   Can one form an intention on Monday to drink 
the toxin, knowing full well that on Wednesday one will have no 
reason to, and indeed will not do so?  Bratman maintains that an 
ideally rational planning agent should, on Monday, form the in-
tention to drink the toxin.  For on Monday, the benefits from in-
tending to drink the toxin outweigh the costs.  However, that 
same rational agent, after the money has been exchanged, would 
then decide not to drink the toxin since there would no longer be 
any reason to.  Bratman feels that a proper theory should return 
this result. 
 The Sophisticated planner would be unable to form the 
intention in the first place.  Because they subscribe to both the 
linking principle and the standard view, and since in this exam-
ple there can be no unforeseen events, the agent would be inca-
pable of intending to do something that would contradict her 
predictable evaluative ranking at the time of action.  Hence, the 
Sophisticated planner, being unable to formulate the intention to 
drink the toxin would not obtain the autonomous benefit. 
The planner using the Resolution method will, on Mon-
day, be able to form the intention to drink the toxin, but Resolu-
tion requires that, on Wednesday the agent go through with their 
plan and drink the toxin.  This is true regardless of the fact that 
there is now no benefit brought about by drinking the toxin.  
Bratman holds that, while this is still and improvement over So-
phistication, there remains significant problems associated with 
Resolution’s handling of the Toxin case: 
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[Resolution], in seeking a strong role for planning 
in achieving the benefits of coordination over time 
and across agents, seems not to do justice to the 
basic fact that as agents we are temporally and 
causally located.7 
 
So, in cases of Autonomous Benefits, the Resolution method al-
lows the benefit to be achieved but does not seem to comport 
with our understanding of the temporal element of agency; i.e. 
that an agent should be capable of altering plans which are in no 
way beneficial (following through with the intention to drink the 
toxin) regardless of past preference. 
 The second class of cases introduced by Bratman is 
known as “Temporary Reversal in Rankings”, or Temptation ex-
amples.  In these cases the agent will form a plan at time t1, then 
without any unforeseen information, at t2 the evaluative rank-
ings of the agent will change.  However, the change in rankings 
is only temporary and the former rankings will return at a time 
in the future t3.  Ann’s case is representative of this class: 
 
Ann enjoys a good read after dinner but also loves 
fine beer at dinner.  However, she knows that if 
she has more than one beer at dinner she cannot 
concentrate on her book after dinner.  Prior to din-
ner Ann prefers an evening of one beer plus a 
good book to an evening with more than one beer 
but no book… [However] each evening at dinner, 
having drunk her first [beer]…she prefers a sec-
ond beer to her after dinner read… As she knows 
all along this change in ranking will be short-
lived: after dinner she will return to her prefer-
ence for a good read.8 
 
 How would our two conventional strategies handle 
Ann’s case?  Sophistication suggests that, because at dinner Ann 
always prefers a second beer, she could never have settled on the 
one-beer plan in the first place (remember, sophistication re-
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quires the agent to adhere to both the linking principle and the 
standard view).  Resolution however, allows that Ann could very 
well form the intention to drink only one beer at dinner.  Ann 
would then be required, (due to the linking principle) of carrying 
out her intention in the event of no unforeseen information.  In 
this case Ann is aware of all relevant information at the time of 
her plan formation, and as such she should drink only one beer 
in accordance with her original plan.  Bratman holds that this is 
the desired outcome for a rational agent, to be able to form plans, 
aware of the fact that at some point in the future the ranking of 
the options would switch, and still carry out one’s original plan. 
 The contrasting results in the Toxin case and Ann’s case 
trouble Bratman.  In each of the situations, it seems that Resolu-
tion is better able to explain the situation than Sophistication, 
enabling the receiving of the autonomous reward and requiring 
Ann to drink only one beer.  However, Bratman holds that the 
Toxin case demonstrates the true weakness of Resolution, its fail-
ure to account for the temporal status of the agent.  It seems that 
a truly rational agent, having received the reward, would not 
drink the toxin; there would simply be no benefit to be had.  
Why is this the case?  Why in the Toxin case do we expect a ra-
tional agent not to follow through with her intentions, but in 
Ann’s case we do?  Resolution and Sophistication are incapable 
of returning results in keeping with our intuitions as to the be-
havior of a rational agent.  A new rational planning strategy is 
required. 
 It is in this pursuit that Bratman introduces the No-Regret 
planning condition that he feels, “avoid[s] both extremes 
[Resolution and Sophistication].”9  The No-Regret condition 
deals with the agent’s decision at the time of the action, on 
Wednesday for the Toxin case and during dinner for Ann.  Brat-
man carefully dissects the argument for action based on future 
regret: 
 
One should act in accord with prior intention in 
the event that: 
Upon sticking with your prior intention, you will 
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be glad you did. 
Upon failing to stick with your prior intention, 
you will wish you had. 
So, other things being equal, 
Though you now prefer to abandon your prior 
intention, you should nevertheless stick with 
it.10 
 
In this way the subject retains the ability to act as a temporal 
causal agent.  At the time of action the agent anticipates the con-
sequences of her following through with previously held plans.  
If she decides that at an “appropriate later time” following 
through with her intentions would lead to regret, then she aban-
dons her plan.11  On the other hand, if she decides that acting in 
accord with her previous plan would not bring about regret, she 
acts consistent with her plan.  How does this divide up the cases 
with which we were dealing?  In the Toxin case the No-Regret 
condition stipulates that we deal with the agent’s decision at the 
time of action, on Wednesday.  Just before drinking the toxin the 
subject must consider her future regret (i.e. Will she regret not 
drinking the toxin?)  It seems that the answer is obviously no.  In 
fact it is much more likely that a rational agent, faced with the 
choice of drinking a revolting concoction with no possibility of 
benefit, would certainly regret drinking said mixture.  This 
seems the proper response, allowing the agent to make a deci-
sion based on their current temporal state. 
 This leaves us with Ann’s case.  Evaluating Ann’s situa-
tion based on the No-Regret principle requires us to evaluate her 
decisions during dinner, at a point when she genuinely prefers a 
second beer to reading her book.  Here again we are given the 
desired response.  Ann, understanding that her preference of a 
second beer over “a good read” is temporary, would, at some 
future point, regret having consumed the second beer.  She will 
regret having abandoned her single-beer policy. 
 This seems a victory for Bratman and his No-Regret con-
dition.  In both situations of Autonomous Benefits and Tempta-
tion we are given the response understood to be that of a rational 
Bratman on Intending 27 
agent.  In this way we avoid the difficulties of both Sophistica-
tion and Resolution and in the process, “arrive at a view of in-
strumentally rational planning agency that does justice both to 
the fact that we are planners and to the fact that we are tempo-
rarily and causally located agents.”12 
 Bratman’s investigation into instrumentally rational plan-
ning agency is well thought out in its handling of rational plan-
ning.  It seems that Bratman’s No-Regret model does provide 
results that correspond to our intuitions. Neither the Resolution 
nor Sophistication models were able to give the correct responses 
in both of the above situations.  In this way Bratman’s No-Regret 
model is a success.  However, I hold that his criticism of both 
theories (which provided the impetus for positing the No-Regret 
theory) rested on an interpretation of intention that is in conflict 
with all prevailing definitions offered by psychologists and phi-
losophers engaged in the study of intention.  Here I will attempt 
to give a brief definition of intentions as they are commonly 
thought of.  As the definition becomes more explicit, it will be-
come ever clearer that Bratman’s concept of intention is at odds 
with the field’s view in general. 
An intention is typically thought of as a pro-attitude (its 
content is the desired alteration of the external world) and con-
sists of a desire and a belief.  While desires themselves are also 
pro-attitudes, there are several distinctions. Because intentions 
are the conjunction of a desire and a belief, they unlike desires, 
must be consistent with our set of beliefs.13  Agent S could safely 
say that she desires to jump over the Empire State building in a 
single bound.  However, should S inform her friends that she 
intends to perform the same task, she will be thought of as very 
odd indeed.  Louis J. Moses states that in order for S to intend to 
A then S must believe at least one of the following: 
 
I can-A 
There is some chance that I will A 
I probably will A 
I will A14 
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Moses feels that option (a) is likely too weak, and option (d) is 
likely too strong.  He concludes that, “intending to A requires a 
relatively strong belief that one will A.”15  In addition to consis-
tency with beliefs, an intention carries a greater commitment to 
action than a desire.  When an agent is said to intend, they are 
said to have “actually decid[ed] to perform the action in ques-
tion,” this is not the case with desire.16  It seems that intentions 
commit us to action in a way that desires do not.  While we have 
no strict consensus on a definition of intention (and a growing 
segment of philosophers believe such a definition will never ex-
ist), there remains some general consensus; that is, an intention 
must be consistent with one’s beliefs and it commits one (in some 
degree) to action.  As will be demonstrated in the remainder of 
this paper, Bratman’s use of “intention” in no way meets the 
above conditions. 
 In his cases of Autonomous Benefit, Bratman describes a 
case in which an intention must be formed.  However, when the 
time comes to perform the action, that was the content of the 
original intention, the agent may then decide whether to follow 
through.  This seems correct, at least it seems in keeping with our 
experience of everyday rational planning.  Bratman uses the ex-
ample of preparing for a job interview with Jones, but upon ar-
riving, Smith has taken her place.  In this situation we must, as 
temporally located agents, be understood to be capable of recon-
sidering and perhaps changing our plans.   However, in the pa-
per under examination, Bratman is not interested in these every-
day vicissitudes, he is interested in cases in which, “one’s cir-
cumstances are, in all relevant aspects, those for which one has 
specifically planned.”17  Here Bratman’s theory as to instrumen-
tally rational planning faces a problem.  In the Toxin case, the 
agent must be aware of “all relevant aspects”, and it seems that 
this must include the agent’s foreseeable disposition not to drink 
on Wednesday.  The agent is aware that as of Wednesday the 
money will have already been distributed, or not, and will un-
derstand that there will then be no incentive to actually drink the 
toxin.  This is certainly a relevant aspect of the case, and the 
agent (being ideally rational) must know that on Wednesday she 
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will not drink the toxin.  This puts the agent in the precarious 
position of intending to do something he knows that he will not 
do.  This is absolutely in conflict with the accepted definitions of 
intention given above.  Bratman is in violation of the condition of 
belief consistency.  One cannot intend to do what one does not 
believe one will do.  In this case the agent, being aware of all 
relevant aspects, does not believe that he will drink the toxin, 
therefore, he cannot have intended to drink.  What the above 
definitions imply, and what Bratman fails to acknowledge, is that 
intention, in the way it is understood in folk psychology and by 
experts in the field, takes on an indefeasible quality.               
 Indefeasibility is a concept most commonly associated 
with Epistemology.  Briefly, in any theory of knowledge sub-
scribing to an indefeasible standard, one is said to know a propo-
sition P if and only if there is no undefeated defeater of your jus-
tification for knowing P.  To clarify, in order for subject S to 
know P, there can exist no evidence E that would undermine S’s 
justification for knowing P.  Such evidence is referred to as a 
“defeater.”  However, S can still be said to know P, if S can pre-
sent evidence D which undermines E.  In this case evidence D is 
referred to as a “defeater-defeater”.  If S is to know P there can be 
no piece of evidence for which there is no “defeater-defeater”, 
such irrefutable evidence is known as an “Undefeated De-
feater.”18 This typically epistemological notion can also be under-
stood as applying to intention.  Just as knowledge is not granted 
in the event of an undefeated defeater of justification, intention 
status may be withheld due to the existence of an undefeated de-
feater of the agent’s belief.  In the case of intentions, a defeater 
can be understood as a piece of information that, if known, 
would defeat the belief that one could or would perform the ac-
tion.  For example, S might intend to join the army.  However, 
person X might inform S that in order to join the Armed Forces, 
one must be at least 5’5” tall, which S is not.  Once understood by 
S, this piece of evidence could be said to successfully defeats S’s 
intention to join the Army.  This is not necessarily an undefeated 
defeater however, if S knows that X is a liar (or simply as poorly 
informed as the author of this paper) and the actual height re-
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quirement is 5’0”, which S easily clears, then S could still be said 
to intend to joint the army.19  
We can now formulate a definition of intention as charac-
terized by indefeasibility; we will call it Intention-Indefeasibility: 
 
Subject S, at time t1, can be said to intend to A, at 
time t2, if there exist no undefeated defeaters of 
S’s intention to A 
 
This can be understood as strong Intention-Indefeasibility, and it 
does not seem to correspond to our intuitions as to intentions.  
For example, in the above case, before it was explained to S that 
he was too short to join the army, one would say that S intended 
to join the army.  It seems that S must be aware of the defeater of 
his intention in order to be said not to intend.  This leads to the 
positing of weak Intention-Indefeasibility: 
 
Subject S, at time t1, can be said to intend to A, at 
time t2, if there exist no undefeated defeaters of 
S’s intention to A of which S is aware. 
 
This seems to correspond nicely with our understanding of in-
tentions.  In fact, it serves a similar function to the first of our 
original conditions, that S’s intention be consistent with his be-
liefs. 
 When examining intentions as used by Bratman through 
the lens of Intention-Indefeasibility it becomes clear that Bratman 
has a substantial problem.  In the case of the toxin, subject S, at 
time t1 is being asked to form an intention to drink a toxin at t3.  
However, as subject S is aware of all relevant aspects of the case, 
S understands that at t3 she will already have acquired the 
money (or not) at t2, and as such will have no reason to drink the 
toxin.  Being a rational agent, S will understand that at t3 S will 
not drink the toxin.  S’s knowledge that she will not drink is a 
clear “undefeated-defeater” of her ability to form an intention to 
drink.  As S is clearly aware of her belief that she will not drink 
the toxin, weak Intention-Indefeasibility tells us that at time t1, S 
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cannot be said to intend to drink the toxin.  In Bratman’s exam-
ple, the billionaire possesses an intention detector and will dis-
cover this lack of intention; ergo, S will not receive the benefit.  
Only by committing in a binding way (indicating that S truly be-
lieves that at t3 she will drink the toxin) will S receive the benefit.  
If she were aware of all relevant information, she would have to 
be committed to following through with her plan.  Any deviation 
from the plan could only be explained by unforeseen events, 
which are explicitly ruled out of the equation.  Bratman has a 
problem. 
On the other hand, Bratman’s examination of the Tempta-
tion case seems to pass the test of weak Intention-Indefeasibility.  
There does not exist an undefeated-defeater, that Ann is aware 
of, which will preclude her from forming her intention.  Ann’s 
temporary ranking of a second beer over a night with a book 
might be considered a defeater of her intention.  However, one 
might posit that Ann’s understanding of her long-term evalua-
tive ranking (reading over beer) might fill the role of defeater-
defeater.  Weak Intention-Indefeasibility concludes that Ann can 
intend to have only one beer and barring unforeseen information 
(here an impossibility) will follow through with her original 
plan. 
Bratman’s investigation into instrumentally rational plan-
ning does elucidate the likely actions of a perfectly rational plan-
ning agent.  In both the Autonomous Benefit and Temptation 
cases, we would like to say that a rational agent would decline to 
drink the toxin or the second beer.  However, closer examination 
has given us reason to doubt the applicability of Bratman’s No-
Regret theory to his “Toxin Case”.  Simply put, Bratman just isn’t 
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